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- <text id=93TT1246>
- <title>
- Mar. 22, 1993: Beating Swordmakers Into Plowmakers
- </title>
- <history>
- TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1993
- Mar. 22, 1993 Can Animals Think
- </history>
- <article>
- <source>Time Magazine</source>
- <hdr>
- DEFENSE, Page 35
- Beating Swordmakers Into Plowmakers
- </hdr>
- <body>
- <p> While Defense Secretary Les Aspin was proposing major
- military-base closings, President Clinton was campaigning to
- save jobs in another endangered sector of the economy: the
- defense industry. Near Baltimore last week he preached the
- rewards of converting weapons plants to civilian production and
- unveiled a five-year, $20 billion plan to help make such
- transitions. Standing before an array of sophisticated
- nonmilitary products, Clinton praised the Westinghouse
- Electronics System Group--mainly a military supplier--for
- branching out into such items as wind-shear sensors for civilian
- aircraft and batteries for electric cars. His message: companies
- that beat their swords into plowshares will create jobs for
- American workers.
- </p>
- <p> But the biblical injunction is more easily preached than
- practiced. Despite Westinghouse's example, Clinton's dream of
- a large-scale missiles-to-toasters conversion is not happening.
- So slim are the chances of success that few defense firms are
- risking money to convert to civilian products. Instead, the most
- successful are battening down to weather the storm, piling up
- cash, and paying down debt. General Dynamics CEO William Anders
- offers this explanation: "Swordmakers don't make good
- plowmakers."
- </p>
- <p> That is too bad, because a lot of jobs are riding on it.
- In the past four years, 440,000 defense workers have been laid
- off--a figure that is expected to grow to 2.1 million by
- 2001. By 1997 the defense budget will be only 3% of GNP, the
- lowest level since the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
- </p>
- <p> Clinton's aid package is designed to encourage what is
- called "dual-use" products, those that have a civilian as well
- as military market. But that approach has been greeted with
- skepticism. Says Anders: "There is no dual use for a tank or
- submarine."
- </p>
- <p> One problem in developing dual-use production is that
- manufacturers still must meet the Pentagon's notorious Military
- Specifications--"Mil-Specs"--which dictate combat
- capabilities not found in off-the-shelf products. Moreover,
- defense managers accustomed to dealing with one customer--the
- Pentagon--have little experience in marketing, let alone
- judging consumer demand as a guide to R.-and-D. investment.
- </p>
- <p> Anders has become the leading exponent of an alternative
- approach to industry survival: sell off anything you're not very
- good at making, or buy companies that will make you a market
- leader in one or two areas. Nothing about conversion; Anders
- doesn't think it works. Under his leadership, General Dynamics,
- the nation's second largest defense contractor, has sold off
- several major divisions. Though Wall Street likes what Anders
- is doing--General Dynamics stock rose 400% in two years--critics call him "the Terminator." "After he sells the last
- light bulb, what's left?" asked an industry observer.
- </p>
- <p> The big reason for the attitudes of Anders and others like
- him is that most defense contractors that tried to switch to
- civilian products failed miserably. A recent study by the
- consulting firm McKinsey & Co. found that fully 80% of military
- contractors stumbled when they acquired commercial firms.
- </p>
- <p> None of that is happening now, but only because the lesson
- has apparently been learned: after decades of failure, almost
- nobody in 1993 wants to try.
- </p>
-
- </body>
- </article>
- </text>
-
-